EU’S ROUTE TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY:

EU’s route to energy independency:

Intro:

Yalta - Crimea from Past to Today:

Yalta and Europe’s military consolidation:

Yalta Agreement of February 1945 laid the groundwork for the division of Europe between East and West. While the partition allowed Moscow to install puppet governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and elsewhere, western Europe aligned with the US and developed democratic systems.

Shortly after Yalta, the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June 1948 marked the most pivotal political events leading directly to the formation of NATO in 1949. The Soviets were concerned that West Berlin, a city located deep inside the Soviet controlled communist territory in Germany, with its capitalist and democratic system would become a propaganda tool to undermine Soviet system in Germany and beyond.

A war torn out Europe without unified military forces could do little to resist an intimidating and victorious Soviet army, which had quickly tapped into additional manpower from Eastern European countries. Through the blockade of Berlin, Stalin’s primary aim was to block Western access to the heart of Germany. Had the Western Allies not responded with the airlifts, the Soviets might have pushed further west and set the stage to take over all of Germany.

Unlike what Stalin had hoped for, western alliance did not abandon West Berlin. Rather than risk losing entire Germany to the Soviets, and potentially facing regime changes at home, the West consolidated militarily under NATO. Within a month the Soviets ended the blockade.

Russian annexation of Crimea, and Donbas and the significance of the annexations for the EU:

Much like the situation Berlin at the start of Cold War, Russia’s annexations of Crimea in 2014 and parts of Donbas in 2022 have effectively served as de facto blockades against the EU. Prior to the annexations, the EU was seriously considering integrating the entirety of Ukraine into the union. Brussels’s first major move in that direction was the proposed “EU Association Agreement (EUAA)”, scheduled to be signed in late 2013, which aimed to deepen Ukraine’s partnership with the EU. Yanukovich rejected the agreement under pressure from Moscow.

The agreement would have allowed the EU to expand its influence across Ukraine, and establish Common Security and Defense Policy missions, including counterterrorism and cybersecurity operations. Although the EU’s push for the EUAA may have accelerated the Russian annexation of Crimea, the EUAA was signed by the Kyiv government in March 2014, only three days before Putin signed annexation treaty with Crimean leaders.

Through the annexations, Russia secured key regions and effectively blocked the EU’s access to strategic resources. This also created a barrier for Ukrainian exports of critical agri-products, minerals and other raw materials to the EU from those regions.

EU’s strategic Autonomy:

The EU is among the world’s richest regions in terms of Human Development and Innovation (HDI), as well as civilizational quality of life. However, as a multinational socioeconomic union, rather than a centralized political or military power, sustaining high living standards depends on stability of the flow of vital resources and supply-chains, including fossil fuels, critical raw materials(CRMs), and agricultural commodities.

In an increasingly competitive global order, where China, Russia and the US are clearly racing for global dominance in trade, tech, and resource control, the EU’s survival relies heavily on its capacity to secure strategic inputs and develop sovereign supply-chains. The absence of sovereign and unified military force capable of projecting hard power or securing the EU’s critical resource corridors without relying on NATO is a foundational vulnerability, addressed also in the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy report. This restricts the Union’s secure access to critical global resources and defend supply routes autonomously, especially in regions like MENA, the Arctic, and key maritime chokepoints.

Although Russia and the US are rivals in many areas, one of their aligned strategic interests is preventing the EU from establishing a unified European military force, with which Europe’s dependencies on both powers could come to an end. Whether through diplomatic signaling, or backdoor agreements, both benefit from a militarily consolidated EU; the US through NATO dominance, and Russia through playing the role of constant common enemy that threatens EU’s security, which often involves in large scale land grabs in EU’s much-needed alternative resource deposits like Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and South Caucasus.

For this reason, the EU’s path to “Strategic Autonomy” needs to be rooted not only in regulatory and soft power but in building genuine economic, industrial and defense sovereignty.

“If Europe doesn’t decide to be a power, it will become a playground for others.”

– Emmanuel Macron, 2023

Ukraine’s Agricultural importance to the EU

Ukraine’s Fertile Farmlands:

Ukraine is known as the breadbasket of Europe, and home to 33 million hectares of arable land, nearly 70% of its total land area. The central and southern regions of the country contain large concentrations of a highly fertile soil type known as Chernozem (Black Soil), which is rich in humus, phosphorus and ammonia. A vast river network supports excellent agricultural conditions in Ukraine, which is widely regarded as having some of the most fertile soil on Earth.

EU’s food security and Ukraine:

In 2024, the EU sourced over €15 billion in farm products yearly from Ukraine, including sunflower oil, soybean oil, and maize. This accounted for almost 36% of total agricultural exports of the country. Ukraine is an essential supplier of feed grains and vegetable protein meals to the EU’s livestock sector. Ukraine’s EU membership would help reduce the union’s strategic dependency for agri-products, like soybean

[source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/760432/EPRS_BRI(2024)760432_EN.pdf]

Studies suggest that with Ukraine’s membership, the EU would surpass Russian wheat production by producing a third of global supply

[source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/760432/EPRS_BRI(2024)760432_EN.pdf]

Russian occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are actually parts of the “fertile corridor” in Ukraine, with arable lands that are at least 45-50% rich in black soil, making up nearly half of total black soil deposits of Ukraine[source: https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f61ed588-e2df-4188-857c-6c7ea8153097/content].

Grain Logistics problem:

When Kyiv signed EUAA, which also included “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” (DCFTA), the EU has finally achieved partial liberalization of Ukrainian agri-products, and their exports. However, Russia’s blockade of Black Sea ports disrupted European plans to establish a seamless crop supply-chain, which is an indispensable component of EU’s “strategic autonomy”.

As much as export security for Ukrainian agri-products, access to the Black Sea has also critical logistical importance for the EU.

The Russian occupation of Crimea locked in the Sea of Azov, making shorelines of oblasts rich in black soil like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk inaccessible.

Therefore, the oblasts under Russian occupation in southeastern Ukraine are particularly valuable to Brussels, not just because they lie within the fertile corridor, but because they provide access to strategically vital seaports. The EU commission, in response to a Belgian parliament member’s written question in 2024 on US and Saudi corporations investing heavily in Ukraine’s arable lands, realizes the importance of Ukraine maintaining and improving the Black Sea ports to continue being a crucial source for the EU’s strategic food-supply dependence [source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2024-002526-ASW_EN.html#ref1]

Ukraine’s energy importance to the EU:

Ukraine is heavily reliant on nuclear energy, producing around 50–55% of its electricity from nuclear sources.

Active Nuclear power plants in Ukraine :

Zaporizhzhia power plant is under Russian Rosatam’s control = energy leverage against EU.

Deposits of lithium, graphite, titanium, and rare earths.

EU’s CRM Action Plan (2020) named Ukraine as a “partner country.”

EU’s 2024 CRM Partnership Agreement with Ukraine [want source help?]

Strategic intent to reduce dependency on China & Africa for tech minerals.

US and Russia Exploit EU’s energy and security dependencies by getting chunks of Ukraine:

U.S. cutting mineral deals directly with Kyiv (e.g., via BlackRock-tied firms).

Russia’s occupation of key mineral-rich oblasts to:

• Disrupt EU access,

• Keep prices volatile,

• Maintain leverage over critical supply chains.

Some of the EU members lack arable lands. which ones?

What do Nordic countries do in Ukraine:
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2024/july/5/nordic-support-for-ukraine-unified-commitment-to-ukraine-recovery

Ukrainian farmland increasingly US-owned:

According to several disquieting reports, mainly US but also Saudi agro-industrial and investment businesses are purchasing Ukrainian farmland on a massive scale.

Cargill, ADM, Blackrock, Oaktree Capital Management and Bunge Limited, for instance, have reportedly gained control over much of Ukraine’s farmland.

This strongly suggests that the United States is seeking to recoup its military support for Ukraine, and ensure a geopolitical presence there in a post-war scenario, through control over Ukrainian farmland and the profits it generates.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2024-002526_EN.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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CITATIONS:

[1] Human Development Index: https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI

[2]

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• EU’s PROBLEM:

• EU is industrial giant with no resource sovereignty.

• EU wants to gain sovereignty over resources it needs.

• EU took action in North Africa:

• Libya: Involvements of Italy, France, Russia, Turkey

• EU took action in Subsahara:

• EUTM Mali

• EUTM CAR

• EU took action in Middle East

• EU took action in Ukraine:

• EUAM Ukraine pre2022 (softer than EUTMs in subsahara)

• Other means?

  • Funding or training of certain groups like activist or armed paramilitaries?

• Global powers want to dominate EU markets for REMs, CRMs, and Hydrocarbons

• US actions,

• US took actions to dominate hydrocarbon markets for EU

• Nord Stream sabotage

• Consolidation of EU under NATO showing Russian Threat

• LNG supply to EU

• US took actions to dominate REM/CRM markets for EU:

• Trump’s Greenland remarks when Greenland’s potential is crucial for EU

• US actions in Ukraine

• Bad treatment to Zelensky

• Zelensky is strongly support by the EU for obvious reasons; military and economic security. EU wants a military buffer zone in Ukraine to serve between Russia and Europe. EU wants this buffer to safely exploit the parts Zelensky is controlling (CRMs, oil, gas, arable lands). US under Biden administration helped EU to achieve both goals by supporting Ukraine in many ways. Trump and Vance’s treatment of Zelensky was done in a public-shaming format to signal the EU that what Biden administration did for the EU was yet to be appreciated, meaning Trump administration wanted US contributions in Ukraine to be recognized -paid- by the EU. As a result, the US cut mineral deals with Zelensky.

• Mineral agreement

• Russia wanted to achieve two things:

• to test the US commitment possibly to the mineral agreement’s support/protection clauses by a limited attack on Zelensky controlled parts of Ukraine instigated with a potential false-flag (Putin’s chopper was going to be targeted).

• and to gain upper-hand prior to the peace talks in Istanbul

• May 16, 2025: First of round Istanbul peace talks

• May 20, 2025: Supposed Assassination Attempt on Putin

• May 24, 2025: Russian Drone Attacks on Kyiv

• June 1, 2025: Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia

• June 2, 2025: Second round of Istanbul peace talks

• The US response was harsh. Trump said Putin played with fire. Then came the Ukraine’s attack to strategic bombers deep inside Russia.

• Russian actions,

• Russia wants to have partial or limited control over almost all alternative resources the EU thinks it could use to provide certain level of resources sovereignty it needs.

• Russian actions in:

• Libya:

• Russia sent in Wagner to support Hafter and to fight over control of the oil fields in the GNA controlled areas. EU (Italy in the first place) supported GNA. France also formally supported GNA but covertly supported Hafter.   

• Mozambique:

• Mozambique hired Wagner to counter Al-Shabab. France-backed Rwanda army secured gas fields protected French corporate (Total) interests

• CAR:

• Wagner supplanted France initiated Operation Sangaris, protected government in exchange for mining rights

•    

• Chinese actions